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GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA: VALIDITY OF STATE
COPYRIGHT UNDER THE COPYRIGHT
AND SUPREMACY CLAUSES
In Goldstein v. California,' the United States Supreme Court defined record or tape piracy as the "unauthorized duplication of recordings ... ."I Record piracy consists of the reproduction of musical
performances from commercially sold recordings without the consent
of the owner of the master record or tape and the sale of copies thus
made in competition with the original producer. Duplicators do not
incur expenses for artists, technicians and other personnel involved in
the production of the original recording, 3 and by confining their efforts
to successful recordings, pirates also avoid the risk of uncertain consumer demand. 4 Consequently, duplicators can market their product
at substantially lower retail prices. Recent estimates suggest that the
annual volume of record piracy may exceed $100 million.5 The sound
recording industry has long sought protection against this apparently
pernicious competitive practice.
Prior to the 1971 sound recording amendment to the federal copyright statutes (Sound Recording Amendment),6 there was no federal
protection against commercial piracy of sound recordings. A proliferation of state remedies filled the vacuum left by federal copyright.'
Sources of state protection have included common law copyright, unfair competition and criminal statutes.8 In essence, these diverse state
remedies have provided copyright protection for an item which was
omitted from the federal copyright scheme, and the potential conflict
between the two systems of copyright has given rise to a continued
1. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
2. Id. at 549.
3. Id. at 550.
4. See Id. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
6. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.). This amendment created federal copyright protection for recordings "fixed, published and copyrighted" on and after February 15, 1972 and before
January 1, 1975. The pirated tapes in Goldstein were produced prior to February 15,
1972; thus, the Sound Recording Amendment was inapplicable. 412 U.S. at 552.
7. See B. RINGER, THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND RECORDINGS,
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
THE SENATE

COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PURSUANT

(1961), in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT,
38 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RINGER].
8. Id.
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debate. The fundamental legal issue which arose out of this development is the compatibility of state copyright for sound recordings with
the federal copyright policies inherent in the copyright clause 9 and the
Copyright Act.' 0 Clearly, in the event of substantial conflict, state
law must give way under the supremacy clause."
The Supreme Court, in Goldstein v. California,'2 held section
653h of the California Penal Code 13 valid as applied to the unauthorized duplication of recordings which were "fixed" prior to the effective
date of the sound recording amendment to the Copyright Act. In sustaining the validity of state "copyright protection. . . for the specific
expressions which compose the master record or tape,"' 4 the Court
established two major principles: (1) the national interest in uniformity of copyright protection-under the copyright clause--does not
require exclusive control by Congress;' 5 (2) the supremacy clause does
not bar state protection of works as to which Congress has remained
silent. 16
The judicial and legislative history of the record piracy issue reflects a struggle to define the nature of property rights in a technological advancement which was not brought within the purview of the federal copyright statutes. This note will analyze the reasoning of the
Goldstein opinion in light of this history, the objectives of federal copyright and the problems of state copyright protection within a national
economy. The principal contention presented here is that the Court's
decision disregarded the fundamental constitutional premise behind the
grant of copyright protection-that is, the private monopoly necessary
to provide incentive for artistic creation must be balanced against the
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "
10. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-216 (Supp. 1973) which comprise the basic copyright law
of the nation.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides that "[tihis Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.. .. "
12. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
13.

CAL. PEN. CODE § 653h (West 1970) provides in part:

"(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record . . . tape . . . or other article on which sounds are

recorded, with intent to sell or cause to be sold. . . such article on which such sounds
are so transferred, without the consent of the owner.
(2) Sells any such article with knowledge that the sounds thereon have been so
transferred without the consent of the owner."
14. 412 U.S. at 551.
15. Id. at 556-60.
16. Id. at 561-70.
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public benefits which accrue from unrestrained competition.' 7 Finally,
an alternative state remedy is suggested by which the competitive position of the record producer can be preserved with only minor adverse
impact on the federal copyright scheme.

History of the Federal Question in Copyright Law
Concept of Publication and Judge Hand's Pre-Emption Theory
Publication has historically marked the dividing line between state
and federal protection for intellectual property.18 Absolute and perpetual rights in an unpublished work are recognized by the common

law, but this common law copyright is divested upon publication."9

The nature and scope of the author's pre-publication rights are determined according to state law.2 0 Unless the author complies with the
federal statutory requirements for registration, a work enters the pub-

lic domain upon publication and can be freely copied.2
The term "publication" is not defined in the copyright statutes,22
but generally the courts view any unrestricted distribution of copies to
the general public as a divesting publication.2 3 This determination is
made through a consideration of the facts of each case "in light of the
policy of the Copyright Act."24 Divergent definitions of publication
17.

See notes 115-17 & accompanying text infra.

18.

U.S.C.A. § 12 (1952) is an exception to this statement, as statutory copy-

right is available for certain classes of unpublished works under section 12. See generally W. STRAUSS, PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, PURSUANT TO S. RES. 240, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961), in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT, ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 189, 196-97 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as STRAUSS].
19. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1908); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
591, 660-61 (1834); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d
Cir. 1904); Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967, 968-69 (No. 1,076) (C.C.D. Ohio
1849); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N.Y.
241, 247, 49 N.E. 872, 873 (1898).
20. See STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 194-95.
21. M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 59, at 229-30 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as NIMMER]. Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 10 (1973), copyright is secured by publication of copies of the author's work with copyright notice affixed to each copy.
22. 17 U.S.C.A. § 26 (1952) defines "the date of publication" as the "earliest
date when copies . . . were placed on sale, sold or publicly distributed .....
... but
this does not constitute a definition of publication. Hirshon v. United Artists Corp.,
243 F.2d 640, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1957); NIMMER, supra note 21, § 49 at 193.
23. See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907);
McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publishing Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 251, 49 N.E. 872,
875 (1898); NIMMER, supra note 21, § 49 at 194-95.
24. Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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under state and federal law can result in inconsistent patterns of protec-

tion for constitutionally protectable works.

Thus the question of

whether publication is to be defined under federal or state law rises to
the level of a constitutional issue under the supremacy clause."

Through a series of opinions written for the Second Circuit, Judge
Learned Hand developed a doctrine of federal pre-emption which focused on the publication issue. At an early stage, Judge Hand believed

that sections 4 and 5 of the federal statutes26 extended the scope of
'27
the Copyright Act to all works qualifying as constitutional "writings"
and that only Congress could grant monopoly protection against copying under the copyright clause. 28 This broad view of the invalidity of

state protection under the copyright clause gave way to a theory of invalidity based upon the policies inherent in the copyright clause and
the federal statues.
In RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,2 9 the Second Circuit
held that the public sale of phonograph records divested the common

law copyright in the performance and that neither the performer nor
the manufacturer could impose post-publication restrictions on the use
of the recording."0

Judge Hand expressed the view that statutory copy-

right would be the only appropriate remedy, because a perpetual monopoly was contrary to the "limited Times" policy of the Copyright Act
and the Constitution. 31 The policy of the limited duration of the copyright monopoly is expressed in the "limited Times" phrase in the copyright clause and in the twenty-eight year term of statutory copyright

provided for in 17 U.S.C.A. section 24.
Judge Hand, in Fashion OriginatorsGuild v. Federal Trade Com25. 17 U.S.C.A. § 8 (1952) provides that "[n]o copyright shall subsist in the
original text of any work which is in the public domain .....
26. 17 U.S.C.A. § 4 (1952) provides that "[tIhe works for which copyright may
be secured . . . shall include all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C.A. § 5 (1952)
enumerates the classes of registerable works, and provides that those classes "shall not
be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4 ......
27. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
"Writings" is the term used in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution with reference
to the subjects of copyright. It has been interpreted to include any embodiment of
the "fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546, 561-62 (1973); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
28. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
29. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
30. Id.; accord, Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54, 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Granz v. Harris, 98 F. Supp. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd and
modified, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record
Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill.
1950). Shapiro and Mills both stated in dicta
that the public sale of phonograph records destroyed common law property rights in
the musical composition which was performed in the recording.
31. 114 F.2d at 89.
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mission,3 also based his disapproval of perpetual state protection on
the fact that it would render federal copyright a "detriment" to the
author. The Fashion OriginatorsGuild and Whiteman decisions concluded that the divesting effect of publication is equally applicable to
works which are not within protectable categories under the Copyright
33
Act.
In his dissent in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp.,3 4 Judge Hand abandoned the view that Congress had brought
all constitutional "writings" within the copyright statute. His retreat
was compelled by the belief that recordings were "writings" which
could not be copyrighted under the Act. However, he restated the
position that the "limited Times" policy demanded that an author either
refrain from publication or eventually dedicate his "writing" to the public. 5 Judge Hand considered uniformity of copyright protection a basic purpose of the copyright clause which further justified the pre-emption of state copyright. 3

The corollary drawn from these propositions

was that publication is a federal question.3 7 Thus, under Judge Hand's
theory of federal copyright, the states, with respect to constitutional
"writings," were precluded from granting perpetual copyright protection
and from deciding the publication issue under state law.
Criticism of Judge Hand's Federal System and Alternative Theories
Several commentators have criticized the rationale of Judge
Hand's pre-emption theory. 8 It has been asserted that the uniformity
purpose and the "limited Times" policy are amply safeguarded by the
32. 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
33. Id. at 83; RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
But see Donaldsons v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774). Donaldsons held that
common law rights are lost upon publication only if statutory protection is available,
but American courts have never accepted this principle. NIMMER, supra note 21, §
59, at 231-231.1.
34. 221 F.2d 657, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1955).
35. Id. at 667.
36. Id. Judge Hand quoted from James Madison's comment that "[tjhe States
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of these cases [patents or copyrights], and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed
at the instance of Congress." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (Modem Library edition
1941).
37. 221 F.2d at 667; cf. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d
Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.).
38. See, e.g., Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound
Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REV. 204, 217-22 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kurlantzick];
Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation"Distinction: A False Step in the Development
of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447-49 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 71 COLUM. L. REV.]; Note, Publication Governed by State Law
Where Recordings Not Eligible for Copyright Under Federal Statute, 56 COLUM. L.
Rav. 126, 129 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 56 COLUM. L. REv.].
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constitutional grant of copyright power to Congress and that there is no
additional need to exclude state protection.3 9 Writers have agreed
that the potential of ineffective or disparate forms of state copyright
does not justify interpreting the copyright clause as itself prohibiting
state protection. 40 The copyright clause, unlike the taxation, bankruptcy, and naturalization clauses, 41 lacks an express manifestation of
the framer's intent to insure uniform laws. Indeed, Judge Hand himself admitted that the harshness of a complete denial of protection for
statutory uncopyrightables was a persuasive element in the alternative

line of thought.42

The trend in cases involving the unauthorized broadcasting and
dubbing of records has been to decide the publication question in accord with state law. 43 The Pennsylvania court, in Waring v. WDAS
BroadcastingStation, Inc.,44 held that a performer's common law property rights in a recording were preserved despite the unrestricted sale
of the record to the public.4 5 In Waring, a label bearing the legend

"Not licensed for radio broadcasts" was held to create an "equitable
servitude" which limited the publication so that the performer could
enjoin unauthorized broadcasts of his recording. 48 In Metropolitan
Opera Association v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,4 7 the court enjoined the sale of unauthorized records reproduced from operatic

broadcasts principally on the theory of unfair competition. Metropolitan Opera held that neither performance nor broadcast constituted a

divesting publication, but the court did not consider 48the effect of the
plaintiff record company's sale of records to the public.
39. 71 COLUM. L. Rnv., supra note 38, at 1448-49; 56 COLUM. L. Rlv., supra
note 38, at 129.
40. Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 222; 56 COLUM. L. Rnv., supra note 38, at
129.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 provides that "Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises . . .; but all Duties, Imports and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States.. ." and "To establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States. ..."
42. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir.
1955) (Hand, J., dissenting); see 56 CoLUM. L. Rnv., supra note 38, at 129.
43. See Note, Performers' Rights and Copyright: The Protection of Sound Recordings from Modern Pirates,59 CALIF. L. RaV. 548, 561 (1971).
44. 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
45. Id.; accord, Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939). Waring
v. Dunlea prompted three state legislatures to pass statutes providing that the sale of
phonograph records results in the loss of common law property rights in the performance reproduced. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 543.02-.03 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 66,
§ 66-28 (1965); S.C. CODE ch. 2 § 66-101 (1962).
46. 327 Pa. at 4748, 194 A. at 638.
47. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 632,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
48. Id. at 798, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
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A leading case in this area, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mecury Records Corp.,4 9 addressed directly the federal implications of publication. The Second Circuit was unanimous in the view that a recorded
rendition of a public domain musical composition was copyrightable
under the Constitution but that Congress had not so provided in the
Copyright Act. 50 The majority inferred that "[s]ince the
Copyright Act does not deal with the -protection of phonograph
records of the performances of public-domain compositions . . .
we have no basis for applying federal law . . . . We must determine what law the New York State courts would apply to ascertain
the extent of the respective rights of plaintiff and defendant." 51
Through a questionable process of reasoning, the court construed the
Metropolitan Opera case to hold that the public sale of records does
not dedicate the producer's "right to copy and sell the records."5 2 Thus
construed, Metropolitan Opera was held to represent the New York
,law on the point, and the rule announced by Judge Hand in the
Whiteman53 decision was cast aside.
The Capitol Records case stands for the principle that works
which have not been made the subject of statutory copyright may be
protected by a perpetual common law copyright which is not lost
through the public sale of copies of the work. Capitol Records has
received much attention and has been followed by a number of decisions." The debate between the majority and Judge Hand in Capi49.

221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).

50.

Id. at 660-61; Id. at 664 (Hand, J., dissenting).

51. Id. at 662.
52. Id. at 663. The plaintiffs in the Metropolitan Opera case were an opera company and its exclusive licensees-a recording company and a broadcaster. The Capitol
Records court concluded that the injunction in Metropolitan Opera would not have been
issued had the New York court's view been otherwise because of the potential paradox

of proscribing the sale of records made from broadcasts of operas while permitting the
sale of records which were unauthorized duplicates of licensed recordings of the same
operas. Professor Nimmer asserted that the court in Metropolitan Opera might well
have recognized a distinction on the following grounds: (1) the operas in question

may have been protected under statutory copyright, in which event the sale of records
embodying such operas would not divest the statutory copyright; (2) the New York
courts would probably grant protection under an unfair competition theory despite the
prior forfeiture of common law rights; (3) protection might have been based on the
intentional interference with contractual rights, in which case the publication question
would be irrelevant. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 51.2 at 206.2-206.3. Thus, in Professor Nimmer's view, the court's reliance on the implicit holding in Metropolitan Opera casts doubt on the Capitol Records decision as authority for the rule that the public

sale of recordings does not constitute a publication.
53. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
54.

See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 493-94 (3d

Cir. 1956); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 882, 252
N.Y.S.2d 553, 557 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d
1034, 1035, 155 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172-73 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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tol Records defined many of the questions which comprise what has
proven to be a continuing constitutional issue.
Development of the Sears-Compco Rule
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.55 and Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting Inc. 56 held that a state could not, consistently with the

federal patent laws, restrict the copying of an article which was not

protected by federal patent or copyright. 57 In Sears and Compco,

lower courts had held the patents on the plaintiffs' mechanical configurations invalid for lack of invention, and the cases had proceeded
under the unfair competition law of Illinois.5" The theory of action
in both cases was that the competitor's sale of a substantially identical
product was likely to cause customer confusion as to the source of the
goods.59 The Court found that Art. 1, §8, 6l.8 of the Constitution and

the implementing federal statutes form a federal system composed of
uniform standards which were designed to promote both invention and
free competition."' Justice Black concluded that the prohibition of,
or the imposition of liability for the act of copying under state law,
conflicted with the policies and objectives of this patent system.
The overriding concept of the "federal system" as a legal instrument designed for the delicate task of balancing the inventor's monopoly against the demands of free competition constituted the basic

premise in terms of which the Court delineated the purposes of federal
patent and copyright. 61 This was the first express judicial recognition of the balance inherent in federal patent and copyright. National
uniformity in patent and copyright laws was cited as a constitutional
and congressional objective.6" The court, in Sears, considered a patent
55. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
56. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
57. Id. at 237. The Court's references to copyright arguably are dicta, because
the articles in issue were unpatentable under a standard of invention set out in the
patent statutes. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). However, it is clear that the Court's reasoning is applicable to federal copyright. Kurlantzick, supranote 38, at 213.
58. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1963).
The Seventh Circuit held the design patent in Compco invalid for lack of invention.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 28 (7th Cir. 1962).
59. 376 U.S. at 227; 376 U.S. at 235-36.
60. 376 U.S. at 228-31; 376 U.S. at 237.
61. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GBNERAL REVISION OF
Tim UNrrED STATES COPYRGHT LAW, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (House Committee on the
Judiciary Print 1961), which states that the ultimate task of the copyright law is to
strike a fair balance between the author's right to control the dissemination of his
works and the public interest in fostering their widest dissemination.
62. The Court cited The FederalistNo. 43 as authority for the proposition that
uniformity was a constitutional purpose. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 228 (1964). See note 36 supra. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (1952), which provides
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monopoly a limited exception to the general rule of laissez-faire; thus,
the grant was restricted in duration and subject matter-that is, only
genuine inventions are patentable. 3 The opinion stated that "[a]n
unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired,
is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses
So. ''64

to do

Following the reasoning of the Court, it is clear that per-

petual state protection for items outside the ambit of permissible federal protection is incompatible with federal patent and copyright policy.
However, a state could, consistently with the Court's opinions, require
labeling or other prophylactic measures to insure the integrity of the
65
consumer's choice of products.
Notwithstanding the numerous references to the copyright laws
in the opinions,60 neither decision dealt with the question whether the
pole lamp in Sears or the light fixture in Compco was constitutionally
copyrightable. 67 In Desclee & CIE., S.A. v. Nemmers, S a decision
which anticipated Sears and Compco, the court held that statutory
copyright is the exclusive remedy for the wrongful copying of published
literary property which may be copyrightable. The rationale of the
Desclee holding was limited to the avoidance of the "fragmentation and
duplicity of causes of action relating to a single right in literary property . . ."69 In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa,7"
the First Circuit held that constitutional "writings" left unprotected
by Congress could be freely copied under the Sears and Compco
rule. The De Costa court found no copyright requirement equivalent
to patent invention, but the court asserted that a failure to comply with
for the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in patent and copyright cases, and

17 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1952), which preserves state protection of unpublished writingsbut does not include published writings-were found indicative of a congressional intent
to have uniformity. 376 U.S. at 231 n.7.
63. 376 U.S. at 229-31. Additional restraints on the patent monopoly are: the
"rights and welfare of the community," strict legal construction of its scope, limited

post-patent rights in the former holder and the antitrust laws. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 231.
65. Id. at 232; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238
(1964).
66. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7, 232 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).

67.

For a discussion of the copyrightability of three dimensional objects, see
(under guidance of Prof. W. Deren-

STAFF OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

berg),

THE MEANING OF "WRITINGS"

IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION,

STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM.

ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND

COPYRIGHTS OF

THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, PURSUANT TO S. RES. 53, 86 Cong.,
Sess. (1960), in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 43,
79 (1963) [hereinafter cited as DERENBERG].

68.
69.
70.

190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
Id. at 391.
377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).

Ist
76-
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the procedural notice requirements of the Copyright Act had the same
disqualifying effect as a lack of genuine invention.7 1 Thus, the court
concluded that state protection of unregistered "writings" conflicted

with an
express congressional limitation on the subject matter of copy72
right.
The list of courts which have followed the Sears and Compco
pre-emption doctrine has been extensive, 7 z but the application of Sears

to common law protection for unpublished works has correctly been
withheld. 74 The Supreme Court has on two occasions implicitly reaffirmed the Sears and Compco rule. In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,75 the
Court established the principle that any temporal extension of the patent monopoly was invalid.76 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins7 , reasserted the
view of the patent as a limited exception to the general federal policy

favoring free competition.78 Justice Black, writing in a concurring
and dissenting opinion, argued that a state could not enforce a private

contract under which an inventor received payments for the disclosure
79
of his unpatentable discovery during the patent application period.
The Sears and Compco rule has not, however, enjoyed universal extension; the courts soon perceived distinguishable problems in certain
forms of piracy of intellectual property.
Misappropriation as an Exception to Sears

Many state and federal courts have held Sears and Compco inapplicable to modes of copying which appropriate a plaintiff's actual
product.80 The decisions have noted a distinction between imitation
71. Id. at 319. It is submitted that the court overlooked the originality standard
in copyright which provides a counterpart to patent invention. The term "Authors,"
found in Art. I § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution and 17 U.S.C.A. § 9 (1952), has been
construed to impose an eligibility requirement of originality for statutory copyright.
NIMMER, supra note 21, at §§ 6, 10-10.2 & 60.
72. 377 F.2d at 319.
73. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965) (no state protection for telecast); Herald Publishing
Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc., 173 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (no
state protection for telecast).
74. Edgar H. Woods Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886
(1964); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42
Misc. 2d 726, 248 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Sears and Compco do not affect
state authority over common law copyright which is reserved in 17 U.S.C. section 2.
75. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
76. Id. at 32.
77. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
78. Id. at 663, 668.
79. Id. at 676-77.
80. E.g., Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1973); Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816, 819
n.1 (10th Cir. 1971); Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340,
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and duplication which nearly captures the exact work product of the
s2
original producer."' InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press
has been relied upon as authority for an unfair competition action based
upon the unauthorized reproduction and low-cost commercial exploitation of a product which is "the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money" by another.8 s It has been held that
an unfair competitive advantage is achieved through the duplicator's
avoidance of the initial costs of production.8 A California court reasoned that continued appropriation would discourage invention and
free competition within the recording industry, because widespread pi85
racy reduced the profit incentive in the production of new recordings.
The apparent lack of alternative relief against commercial piracy also
seems to have motivated judicial acceptance of the misappropriation

distinction. 0
Courts and writers have criticized the effort to distinguish the
Sears and Compco decisions on the basis of the manner of reproduction. 7 The distinction rested upon the relative degree of technical proficiency and cost of the duplication process-that is, a more exact and
inexpensive copy is found to be an appropriation of the originator's
350 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 401 U.S. 901 (1971),
aff'd, No. 26,628, 9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1973; Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App.
2d 429, 432-34, 264 N.E.2d 874, 876-77 (1970). All of the above cases dealt with
state protection against record piracy.
81. E.g., Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 350

(C.D. Cal. 1970).
82. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
83. Id. at 239.
84. E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536-37, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 798, 805-06 (1969); Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20,

21-22, 180 S.E.2d 414, 415-16 (1971).

A record or tape duplicator does not incur

expenses for artists, producers, union funds, excise taxes, promotion and advertising and
is therefore able to market a duplicate sound recording at a reduced price. Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 879, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, 55455 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
85. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 538, 82 Cal. Rptr.
798, 806 (1969).
86. Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F.
Supp. 578, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (appropriation of news stories). Pottstown also questioned the Sears interpretation of the failure of Congress to extend the Copyright Act
to certain articles. Pottstown suggested that congressional inaction may be the result
of constitutional limits on the copyright power rather than a policy favoring free access
to such items.
87. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315,
318 (1st Cir. 1967) which held that Sears and Compco had overruled International
News Service. One writer has suggested that the De Costa holding can be explained
by the fact that there was no diversion of profits from the plaintiff under the facts
of that case.
Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine After Sears-Compco, 2
U.S.F.L. REv. 292, 313 (1968).
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product, labor and investment. Critics have maintained that these factors are immaterial under the Sears and Compco rule and that any
state monopoly which prohibits duplication would be invalid under
88
Sears.
In International Tape Manufacturers Association v. Gerstein,89
a district court in Florida held that a state criminal statute which prohibited record piracy conflicted with the "limited Times" policy and the
notice-registration requirements of the federal copyright scheme. The
Gerstein court concluded that state protection equivalent to copyright
was inconsistent with the purposes of federal copyright as interpreted
by Sears and Compco. 0 The decision emphasized that Sears and
Compco compelled the finding of unconstitutionality regardless of
whether Congress had intended to pre-empt the field.9 1 Thus, under
Gerstein, the federal policy announced in Sears and Compco is not limited by either the manner of copying or the absence of a congressional
intent to preclude state protection. The focus of Sears and Compco,
according to Gerstein, is on the character of state protection for works
which have been omitted from the federal statutes.
Analysis of the Goldstein Decision
Validity of State Protection for Sound
Recordings Under the Copyright Clause
The issue of the constitutionality of state copyright for sound recordings was still unsettled in 1973. Federal copyright was available
for recordings manufactured after February 15, 1972,92 but the plethora of state remedies remained the only source of protection for recordings produced prior to that date. The petitioners in Goldstein v.
California93 were convicted under section 653h of the California
Penal Code9 4 for acts of "record piracy"--that is, the reproduction
and sale of unauthorized copies of recordings produced by other recording companies. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the Califonia statute under the copyright
and supremacy clauses. The first contention considered by the Court
was that the California statute was in effect a state grant of copyright
which was invalid under Art. I, §8, cl. 8 of the Constitution.
88. See International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38, 51 (S.D.
Fla. 1972); NIMmR, supra note 21, § 35.224 at 146.23; Kurlantzick, supra note 38,
at 215-16.
89. 344 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
90. Id. at 51-52.
91. Id. at 51-54.
92. See note 6 supra.
93. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
94. See note 13 supra.
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The Court relied on Cooley v. Board of Wardens95 and the Federalist No. 32 to provide the criteria with which to decide if the concurrent exercise of copyright power by the states was compatible with
the constitutional authority of Congress in the field. 96 The Cooley
decision stated that:
[e]ither absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [the commerce] power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose
sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert
concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part.
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be97 of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation
by Congress.
The Federalist No. 32 established the principle that a constitutional
grant of a non-exclusive power to Congress precludes state exercise of
a similar power only where concurrent exercise would necessarily lead
to conflict.9 8
Application of the Cooley Doctrine: Local v. National Subjects
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority of the Court, in
Goldstein observed that although the copyright clause sought national
uniformity, it did "not indicate that all "writings" are of national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded." 99 The opinion cited a number of 18th century colonial and state
patents as evidence of a willingness on the part of the states to promote
local art and invention. 100 In view of the increased diversity in personal interests, business and industry in modern society, the Court suggested that works of purely local importance are more likely to exist.'
The Court reasoned that because constitutional writings may be of
"purely local importance," there is no compelling national interest
which requires exclusive federal control.' 02
The Court's argument followed the approach which Cooley warned
against; that is, Goldstein asked whether all "writings" require national
regulation instead of examining the need for federal copyright with regard to the particular "writing" before the Court. The Cooley opinion
was carefully confined to the decision that the constitutional grant of
95.

53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).

96.

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-55 (1973).

97.

53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 197 (Modern Library edition 1941) (A. Hamilton); see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973).

98.

99.
100.
101.
102.

412 U.S. at 556-57.
Id. at 557 n.13.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 558.

April 1974]

GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA

1209

the commerce power did not deprive the states of the power to regulate
harbor pilots, and this result was reached because of the need for diversity due to "the local necessities of navigation."'1 °3 The purpose of
the commerce clause and the underlying standard in the Cooley test
was the preservation of the free flow of interstate commerce against
state regulation which furthered the economic advantage of a state at
the expense of a national market.' 0 4 The thrust of the Cooley test was
that the exclusivity of congressional power depended upon the circumstances of particular cases.-0 5 A "national subject," under the Cooley
approach is a subject of regulation as to which the need for national
uniformity outweighs local interests in state control.' 0
Later commerce clause opinions in the field of transportation support this interpretation of the Cooley test. The Court, in Morgan v.
0 7
Virginia,1
stated that:
[alIthough the quality of [the Cooley] principle is abstract, its application to the facts of a situation created by the attempted enforcement of a [state] statute brings about a specific determination as to
whether or not the statute in question is a burden on commerce.
Within the broad limits of the [Cooley] principle, the cases turn on
their own facts.' 08
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,0 9 the Court concluded that uniform regulation of interstate train lengths was essential to the operation of a national railroad system."' The Court found that the adverse effects on railway efficiency and economy resulting from the enforcement of the Arizona train-limit law outweighed any increase in
safety accomplished through the statute."' Thus, throughout its application, the Cooley test has demanded judicial 2scrutiny of the facts
of the subject matter of state regulation sub judice.1
Adherence to the Cooley rule, in the context of state protection
of sound recordings against unlicensed duplication, compels an analysis different from that developed in Goldstein. Prior to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, twelve states had passed copyright laws, 1 3
103. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
104. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-68 (1945); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 132
(Modem Library edition 1941) (A. Hamilton).
105. B. SCHWARTZ, CONsTrruTioNAL LAW 108-09 (1972).
106. Id. at 109; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1946).
107. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
108. Id. at 377-78; see Wilmington Transp. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of the State of
California, 236 U.S. 151, 154-56 (1915).
109. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
110. Id. at 781-82.
111. Id.
112. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); South Carolina
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
113. DERENBERG, supranote 67, at 47.
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and a principal object of the copyright clause was to remedy the resulting lack of uniform protection through nationwide laws." 4 Under
the constitutional theory posited in Sears and Compco, copyright is a
limited exception to the federal policy of free competition, and the exercise of the copyright power requires balancing of the need for economic incentives for authors against the commercial and consumer interests in a competitive economy." 5 Questions of balancing involve
the duration of protection, classes of protectable works, and, as Goldstein stated, "the commercial importance of the product to the national
economy."116 The issue, applying Cooley, therefore is whether state
protection for sound recordings--equivalent to copyright-is consistent
with the constitutional purposes and limits related to the copyright
power.
The basic constitutional theory of copyright, implicit in Art. 1,
§8, cl. 8, is that the public and the author benefit from the grant of
an exclusive right to commercial exploitation of original and creative
works for a limited period. The advantages to the public consist of
the inducement of further progress in the arts and the assurance that,
after a definite period of time, the work will become available for public use. The "limited Times" policy insures eventual free accessibility
of the works and promotes variety in editions of the work, wider opportunity for competitive distribution, and use of the work "as the basis for new creation."" 7
114. Id. at 47-48; see THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (Modem Library edition
1941) (J. Madison). See note 36 supra.
115. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249,
255-56 (1945) (patent power); Precision Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (patent power); NIMMER, supra note 26, § 10.1, at
192. See notes 55-65 and 75-79 & accompanying text supra. Sears, quoting from Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938), acknowledged the consumer interest in a competitive economy: "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in
the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested." 376 U.S. at
231.

116.

412 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added); see J.

STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM.

GUINAN, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT,

ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,

AND COPYRIGHTS OF

S. RES. 240, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1961) in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 473,
492-93 (1963) [hereinafter cited as GUINAN]. See notes 55-65 and 75-79 & accompanying text supra.
117. See GUINAN, supra note 116, at 492-93; H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1909).
See also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) in
which the Court stated: "[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors;" United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131, 158 (1948); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973),
THE SENATE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, PURSUANT

TO
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Production and marketing of original and "dubbed" copies of
sound recordings are conducted on a national scale; 118 therefore,
Goldstein's emphasis on the purely local importance of "writings" is
misplaced. The effect of California and other states' statutory prohibition of the manufacture and sale of "pirated recordings""' 9 is not
confined to the promotion of a local industry; such statutes inhibit interstate trade and competition. Low-cost reproductions, if unauthorized, 20 may not be sold in California even if produced legally in another state, and the aggregate effect of state copyrights for sound recordings is the curtailment of the nationwide supply of low-cost reproductions. 1 1 The grant of a monopoly with substantial national impact on competition and consumer access would, under the Cooley test,
seem to necessitate a national perspective with regard to the constitutional requisite of monopoly-competition balancing. Thus, copyright
protection which affects products in the national economy would, under Cooley, lie in the domain of exclusive federal power.
Application of the FederalistNo. 32: Necessary Conflicts

The Goldstein opinion next pointed out the absence of "necessary
conflicts" between the state grant of copyright and the interests of nonrev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4631 (U.S. May 13, 1974); Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 223; Note,
Copyright Protection for Uncopyrightables: Common Law Doctrines, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 699, 731-34 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 108 U. PA. L. Rav.]. See notes 7, 9,
36 and 71 supra and note 115 & accompanying text supra.
118. See Respondent's Brief against Granting Certiorari at 8, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), which states that petitioners distributed tapes throughout the
United States. See also W. Hurs & W. HALE, 1 TAE RacoRD INmusRY BooK 327
(1961); Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 237; Wilmarth, Statutory Remedies for Record
Piracy, 12 A.S.C.A.P. CoPyEIGiT LAw Sywosrum 261, 276 (1963); Note, Piracy on
Records, 5 STAN. L. Rnv. 433, 436 (1953).
119. Nine other states have criminal statutes similar to that of California: Axuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1024 (Supp. 1973); Apx. STAT. ANN. § 41-4617 (Supp. 1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041 (1972); IL R v. STAT. ANN. § 14:223-223.4 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 561 (McKinney 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4878.1 (Supp. 1973-74); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4244 to 39-4250 (Supp. 1973);
Tx. Rv. Cvn.m STAT. ANN. § 9012 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-41.1 to 59.141.6 (1973).
120. In the event major record companies license duplication, a consequent royalty
system would likely increase the consumer price for duplicated and original recordings.
Comment, The Civil Remedies for Disklegging, 33 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 190, 198 (1960).
121. "Record pirates" offer the consumer a low-cost recording composed of a
selection of popular performances by several different artists not otherwise available.
Brief for Custom Recording Co. et al. as Amici Curiae, at 2-3, Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973). Duplicators have, to a limited extent, filled a gap left by the
major producers in low-demand markets-for example, jazz and classical recordings.
See Note, Record Piracy and Copyright: Present Inadequacies and Future Overkill, 23
MAiNE L. Rnv. 359, 363-65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 23 MAnE L. Rnv.]; 5
STAN. L REv., supranote 118, at 442-43.
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granting states or Congress. The Court's reasoning rested on the premise that interstate conflict is minimized because a state copyright "has
effect only within its boundaries."' 2 2 Individuals may purchase "pirated" works in states where copying is not proscribed, but "each
State's copyrights will still serve to induce new artistic creations within
that State ... "123 Potential friction in the concurrent exercise of
copyright power by Congress and the states could, in the Court's view,
be resolved through federal authority to pre-empt state protection which
12 4
Congress finds incompatible with the national interest.
The focus of the Court's argument on state copyright in the abstract again omitted important aspects of the record piracy question.
Lack of uniformity in copyright imposes a burden on both duplicators
and frustrated purchasers nationally, notwithstanding the fact that the
legal effect of a state copyright is circumscribed by geographical boundaries. The threat of both criminal and civil liability and the loss of
investment capital under diverse and changing state laws inhibits the
interstate sale of sound recording reproductions.' 2 5 Major sound recording producers incur considerable expense and inconvenience in securing state protection under common law theories of action.12

6

Pro-

tection based on criminal liability does alleviate the burden on major
producers, but duplicators must continue to monitor changing state
definitions of the scope of the producers' rights in order to avert sur1 27
prise liability.
Congressional authority to pre-empt state regulation has not provided a reliable check on the problems inherent in the lack of uniformity in copyright protection for sound recordings. Legislative attempts
to make sound recordings copyrightable began in 1906, and congressional intent on the subject remained inconclusive 2 until the Sound
122. 412 U.S. at 558.
123. Id. at 558-59.
124. Id. at 559.
125. Brief for Custom Recording Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 6-9, Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Goldstein recognized a potential burden on interstate commerce in its statement that: "[wlhere the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright
Clause and the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection.' ' 412
U.S. at 559 (emphasis added). See generally Kurlantzick, supra note 38 at 236-46.
126. See Brief for Custom Recording Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 6-9, Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 575
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377
F.2d 315, 319 n.7 (1st Cir. 1967); Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221
F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting).
127. See Brief for Custom Recording Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 6-9, Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); 108 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 117, at 730-31.
See note 168 infra.
128. RINGER, supra note 7, at 139-55.
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Recording Amendment of 1971 which provided only temporary copyright protection for a limited class of recordings. 129 Congressional inaction has been attributed more to an inability to settle the economic
demands of various interest groups regarding appropriate forms of protection than to direct opposition to the principle of protection against
unauthorized dubbing. 130 Hence, legislative silence with respect to
sound recordings has not marked a determination that "neither federal
protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the national interest . . .,. It thus appears that federal copyright reform has
moved so slowly that deliberate congressional action could not have
served as13 2 an effective safeguard against interstate or state-federal
conflicts.
"Limited Times" Inapplicable to the States
Goldstein went on to hold that the "limited Times" provision in
the copyright clause "can only be understood as a limit on congressional, and not state action.' 33 Because the state monopoly is confined
within state borders, the Court concluded that "any tendency to inhibit
further progress in science or the arts is narrowly circumscribed."' 34
The brevity of the Court's discussion of the "limited Times" provision
35
is matched by the paucity of direct evidence of the Framers' intent;'
however, a number of courts and writers have taken a contrary view.' 3 6
Insofar as the "limited Times" policy imports a constitutional mandate
for monopoly-competition balancing, there would seem to be no reason
to exempt state copyright from compliance with the basic constitutional
theory of the function of copyright.137 However, the Court's argument rested on a narrow view of the purposes of the copyright power
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "[t]he objective [of the copyright power] is to
promote the progress of science and the arts."' 38 Accepting the Court's
129. See note 6 supra. The Sound Recording Amendment afforded only temporary protection for sound recordings in order to allow further consideration of alternative solutions; also, it was anticipated that a full revision of the federal copyright statutes would be enacted by January 1, 1974. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
1-2 (1971).
130. See RniNER, supra note 7, at 139-55, 165-68; DEMMmERG, supra note 67, at
54-57.
131. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
132. See Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 250.
133. 412 U.S. at 560.
134. Id. at 560-61.
135. See DERENBER, supra note 67, at 48.
136. See Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 222-23; 71 CoLum. L. Rnv., supra note
38, at 1467-68. Contra, Kaplan, Performer'sRight and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 H.nv. L. REv. 409, 420-21 (1956). See notes 28-35, 63, 65, 75-79,
89-91 &accompanying text supra.
137. Cf. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 5.4. See note 117 & accompanying text supra.
138. 412 U.S. at 555.
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dictum that state copyright is purely local in effect, it follows the conflict between perpetual state protection and the progress of the arts
would be de minimis.
The Court's holding that the constitutional limit on the duration
of copyright is inapplicable to the states does not detract from the argument posited above. Under the terms of the bargain prescribed by
the copyright clause, an author promises eventual surrender of his work
to the public in exchange for an exclusive right to commercial use
which is limited in time. The ultimate beneficiary of this agreement
is the public which derives greater access to authors' works. Where
the grant of copyright for a product in the national economy would affect the public interest nationally, the copyright clause and "basic principles of federalism ' 139 would seem to require congressional balancing of the competing policies at stake. 40
Validity of State Protection for Sound
Recordings Under the Supremacy Clause
The second half of the Goldstein opinion analyzed the question
whether state copyright for sound recordings impaired the execution
of congressional purposes in this field. Following the liberal construction traditionally given the constitutional term "writings," the Court
asserted that "recordings of artistic performances may be within the
reach of Clause 8."''" The Court's broad interpretation of the constitutional terms "writings" and "authors" is consistent with the historical view taken by the legislature and the courts. 1 42 In the absence
of direct data concerning the Framers' meaning, writers have surmised
that the copyright clause was intended as a mere assurance of uniformity or limit on perpetual common law copyright. 43 Congressional deliberations concerning proposed additions to the class of copyrightable
subjects reflect a belief that "writings" is a standard capable of expanding along with commercial and technological developments. 44
139. Id. at 554. The Court quoted from Gibbons v. Ogden: "[tihe genius and
character of the [federal] government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to
* * .those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which
are completely within a particular State .......
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
140. See 108 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 117, at 732. The author points out that
only large scale legislative investigation can properly consider all the economic interests involved in the grant of a copyright. Clearly a state legislature is a less appropriate body for the measurement of the national impact of copyright protection for
sound recordings.
141. 412 U.S. at 562.
142. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1909).
143. DERENBERG, supra note 67, at 48-49.
144. See Id. at 49-61; RINGER, supra note 7, at 139-155; note, Copyright-Study
of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1263 (1956).
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have generally been considered to fall within
Thus, sound recordings
145
the copyright clause.
State Copyright and the Compulsory License Under Section 1(e)

Petitioners contended that Congress, in creating a limited copyright to control the use of musical compositions in recordings, 146 had
determined that a recording and the performance embodied therein
were not worthy of copyright protection. 4 7 The Court pointed out
that Congress had addressed only the rights of composers in its enactment of section 1 (e) of the Copyright Act, and the opinion attributed
to Congress the intent that "composers were to have no control over

the recordings themselves."' 48 There was, in the Court's view, no spe-

cific congressional intent to free recordings from state regulation.' 4 9
The opinion added, by way of dicta, that the challenged state statute
did not cut off royalties to which the composer was entitled under the

compulsory licensing clause in 17 U.S.C. §1(e).1150 Chief Justice Burger based this judgment on both the fact that modem means for re-

producing recordings were unavailable in 1909 and the conclusion that
statutes which diminish the number of copies produced-for example-taxing statutes-do not directly conflict with the purpose of section (e).' 5 '
By limiting the recording right of the owner of the music copyright, Congress sought to secure "to the composer an adequate return
from all use made of his composition" and to prevent the formation of

an impending popular music monopoly built upon the composer's
rights.15 2

As a result, protection for musical compositions against re-

145. See Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589, 590 (D.D.C. 1972); H.R. REP.
No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); DERBNBERG, supra note 67, at 56-57; NImMER,
supra note 21, § 8-32 at 21-22. But see RiNGER, supra note 7, at 151-52, 154. See
text accompanying notes 34 and 50 supra.
146. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e) (1952). This section provides that the musical composition copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the composition on recordings, and "as a condition of extending the copyright control. . . , whenever the owner
of a musical copyright has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of
the copyrighted work [in recordings], any other person may make similar use of the
copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents
on each [copy] ... "
147. 412 U.S. at 563. Petitioners cited the House Report on the 1909 Act: "It
is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the
control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use of
such devices." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
148. 412 U.S. at 565-66.
149. Id. at 566.
150. Id. at 566-67 n.23.
151. Id.
152. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (emphasis added). A
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cording and mechanical reproduction under section 1(e) does not constitute a copyright in recordings or renditions of the composer's
work.' 53 However, the owner of the composition copyright is not without some control over recordings of his composition. Under section

101(e) of the Copyright Act, infringement "by the unauthorized manufacture, use or sale of [reproductions]" is subject to injunction and
liability for up to three times the royalty established in section 1(e).'"
In Miller v. Goody,'5 5 the court asserted that upon compliance with
the notice and royalty requirements of sections l(e) and 101(e), a
manufacturer was entitled to produce pirated recordings of the composer's work.' 56

Goldstein's narrow construction of the term "similar use" in section 1(e) is contrary to the judicial and legislative trend to expand the
reach of statutory protection under the Copyright Act. 157 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 5 ' the Court cautioned
against interpretations of the copyright statutes which would preclude
the accomodation of new inventions and discoveries.' 5 9 Although
major recording company had contracted with leading music publishing houses for the
rights of mechanical reproduction in the copyrighted music controlled by the publishers.
Id. at 7-8; W. BLAISDELL, THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSE,
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF

(1960), in 2 STUDIES
ON COPYRIGHT, ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 937, 958-59 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as BLAISDELL]; H. HENN, THE COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PURSUANT TO S. RES. 53

COPYRIGHT LAW, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND

COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PURSUANT TO S. RES. 53,
(1960), in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 877, 931
(1963) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
153. See HENN, supra note 152, at 897-98. See note 147 supra. But see Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 963 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909), which stated that a recording of a musical composition could be copyrighted under the 1909 Act. But cf.
Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912), which granted
a licensee of the composition copyright owner a preliminary injunction under the Copyright Act against duplication of the licensee's records. Fonotipia and Aeolian have
been subject to extensive criticism and have not been received as law in this area. See,
e.g., Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572, 578
(D.N.J. 1972); NIMMER, supra note 21, § 108-4621 at 432-33; RINGER, supra note 7,
at 123, 125-26.
154. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(e) (1952).
155. 139 F. Supp. 176, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957).
156. Id. at 177; accord, Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1972) (Byrne, J., dissenting); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972). Contra, Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458
F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972).
157. See note 144 & accompanying text supra.
158. 392 U.S. 390 (1967).
159. Id. at 395 (application of Copyright Act to community antennavision). See
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modem duplicating processes were not in existence in 1909, record and

piano roll manufacturers testified before Congress on the problems of
piracy as early as 1905.160 Reproduction of records on a commercial
scale was therefore not beyond the potential scope of uses similar to that
described in section 1(e)----"use . . . upon the parts of instruments
serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work ... ."" Thus,
it is submitted that technological advancements in the processes of
reproduction do not constitute relevant grounds for limiting a grant of

to insure the owner of compensation for
copyright protection designed
162
use made of his work.

If the duplication of sound recordings is a proper subject for compulsory licensing under section 1(e), a manufacturer's right under state
law creates conflicts in addition to the diminution of statutory royalties. Section 653h of the California Penal Code, unlike a taxing stat-

ute, prohibits all unauthorized duplication of sound recordings and
consequently shifts control over the reproduction of musical works
from the composer to the producer. Under state copyright, the producer's absolute monopoly supersedes the composer's limited protection against duplication under section 1(e).163 One writer has recently
pointed out that this shift in control limits the copyright holder's authority over reproduction without stimulating wider dissemination of musical works. It was argued that this result disturbs the balance in section 1(e) between incentives for the composer and the dissemination
of musical works.16 4
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Trade-Mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
160. RINGER, supra note 7, at 121. See Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904), in which the court granted a preliminary injunction against record piracy under a theory of unfair competition.
161. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e) (1952); see HEN, supra 152, at 895 n.59.
162. See S. REP. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 5 (1971); NIMmBR, supra note 21, § 108.4621, at 431-32. These
congressional reports stated that the modem record pirate who satisfies the composer's
royalty does not violate federal law. Compliance with the compulsory license requirements of section l(e) is common among larger record duplicators. See Brief for Custom Recording Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 2-3, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973).
163. See Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLuM. L. Rnv. 185, 190 (1956).
This problem is exacerbated by the efforts of recording companies to avoid compulsory
licensing through negotiated licenses with music publishers and failure to obtain a copy.right under Section 1(e). Id. at 191. Section 1(e) prohibits exclusive licensing of
producers; thus, if no copyright is secured, an unlicensed producer can nevertheless proceed under section 1(e) and manufacture recordings after the composition has once
been recorded. See BLAISDELL, supra note 152, at 948-49.
164. Kurlantzick, supra note 38, at 235. Other commentators have noted that a
producer's copyright would curtail free use of particular renditions of a composer's music but that section 1(e) guaranteed only free use of musical works. Kalodner &
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While the Goldstein decision does not vitiate the effectiveness of
section 1 (e) as a safeguard against a monopoly in the use of music,"'
nevertheless, the decision overlooked the relative interests of the com-

poser and consumer under section 1(e).

Under standard contractual

arrangements, the record producer retains sole discretion over the pro-

duction and distribution of recordings. 166

The producer's interest in

withdrawing marginally profitable recordings from the market thus
prevails over the interests of the consumer and composer of such
works. 6 ' State protection against duplication thus augments the producer's already existing contractual control over reproduction without
compensating the composer or consumer; therefore, the producer's right
under state law contravenes the purposes of section 1 (e). 6 '
Sears and Compco Distinguished
The Goldstein opinion next considered whether "Congress
[had] so occupied the field of copyright protection as to pre-empt

all comparable state action.'

69

The Court concluded in light of con-

sistent administrative, judicial and legislative interpretations, 170 that
sections 4 and 5 of the Copyright Act' 1 did not bring all constitutional
"writings" within the provisions of the Act-that is, Congress did not
intend to extend
copyright to sound recordings which are constitutional
"writings". 172 The omission of sound recordings from the federal
copyright scheme provided the basis for distinguishing the Sears and
Compco cases' 73 from the facts in Goldstein.
Vance, The Relations Between Federal and State Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property, 72 HARv. L. Rav. 1079, 1123 (1959). To the extent that availability of music to the public is an objective under section 1(e), the Kalodner and Vance distinction is unpersuasive.
165. A producer's state remedy against duplication does not effect the prohibition
against exclusive licensing of musical compositions imposed by section l(e). One
writer has suggested that the threat of a music monopoly no longer exists in the recording industry. See BLAISDELL, supra note 152, at 959-61.
166. Id. at 949; 23 MAINE L. REV., supra note 121, at 372-74.
167. See 23 MAINE L. REv., supra note 121, at 371-75.
168. Another source of conflict between state copyright and the Copyright Act
is the absence of notice and registration requirements for state protection. One court
found a state criminal statute, like section 653h, invalid on this ground and because
the state protection was of unlimited duration. International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38, 54-55 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
169. 412 U.S. at 567.
170. E.g., Jerome v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 736, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 and 5 (1971); S. REP.
No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1973).
171. See note 26 supra.
172. 412 U.S. at 567-68. The Court's discussion is confined to congressional intent prior to the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. See note 6 supra.
173. See notes 50-61 & accompanying text supra.
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The Court noted that Sears and Compco dealt with articles which
were within a patentable class-machines-but lacking in inventiveness under express statutory standards-1 4 As to this patentable class,
the Court described the congressional purpose as a balance between
incentives for genuine invention and "the need to insure competition
in the sale of . . . substantially identical products."' 1 5 In the case
of sound recordings, Goldstein found that Congress had stayed its hand
absolutely and that state law could fill the void left by congressional
inaction. The guiding premise of the Court's decision was that no
congressional intent or purpose can be inferred as to items which have
not been made a part of the statutory plan. In dismissing the petitioner's argument that the duplicated tapes had been published, the Court
stated the controlling principle:
publication serves only as a term of the art which defines the legal
relationships which Congress has adopted under the federal copyright statutes. As to categories of writings which Congress has not
brought within
the scope of the federal statute, the term has no
application. 176
Legislative history demonstrates that the omission of sound recordings from section 5 of the Copyright Act did not result from a
congressional determination that recordings were not copyrightable under the Constitution or that piracy was not worthy of national attention. 7 7 Professor Chafee advanced the argument that recordings were
excluded because they could not be integrated with the administrative
machinery of the 1909 Act-that is, recordings were not adapted to
the registration, notice and deposit requirements of the Act. 78 Numerous complex demands of competing interest groups and technical
deficiencies in proposed bills also impeded congressional deliberation
on the extension of copyright to sound recordings. 7 9 Thus, congressional inaction with respect to sound recordings does not reflect the
careful balancing which was associated with the unpatentable articles
in Sears and Compco.
In distinguishing Sears and Compco, the Goldstein opinion also
shifted the focus of pre-emption analysis from the constitutional and
statutory purposes and limits of federal copyright to the specific congressional intent regarding particular categories of "writings." One
problem which arises from this approach is that Congress rarely ad174. 412 U.S. at 569; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1970).
175. 412 U.S. at 569.
176. Id. at 570 n.28.
177. See notes 128-30 & accompanying text supra.
178. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLum. L. REv. 719,
735 (1945); see 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 12, 13, 19, 20 (1952).
179. See note 128 supra.
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dresses the question as -to whether a state law should be pre-empted. 180
A second difficulty with the Goldstein analysis is that the statutory
"inclusion and exclusion" test neglects constitutional criteria which
form an integral part of the substantive statutory scheme and which
apply to a broader scope of subjects than that of the implementing
statutes. Goldstein delineated the pre-emption question in terms of express congressional intent; Sears and Compco decided the issue in
terms of the combined pre-emptive effect of the patent-copyright
18
clause and the patent statutes.
Sears and Compco reasoned that national uniformity, limited duration, free competition and genuine invention comprised the federal
copyright and patent standards in both Art. 1, §8, cl. 8 and the patent
and copyright statutes.'8 2 The Court in Compco stated that
[t]o forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing
federal statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal
patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain. 8 3
The "limited Times" provision was the constitutional foundation of
monopoly-competition balancing in copyright and patent; therefore, its
mandate extended to all constitutional "writings" and "inventions.' 84
Sears and Compco did not restrict the rule to patentable or copyrightable classes; 8 5 however, the federal preference for competition did not
require pre-emption of all state protection of constitutional "writings"
and "inventions". 8 6 Sears and Compco thus call for a judicial deter180. See Comment, Pre-Emption as Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 209 (1959). But see note 214 & accompanying
text infra.
181. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1083-86 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 70 (1973) (No. 187); Tappan Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 380 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1967). See notes 60-63 & accompanying text supra.
182. Genuine invention is not a statutory standard in copyright; however, original-

ity is a nonstatutory requirement for eligibility. See note 76 supra.
183. 376 U.S. at 237.
184. Id., at 228-31; see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377
U.S. 476, 522 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto-

motive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1082-86 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 70 (1973)

(No.

187); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315, 319 (Ist Cir.
1967); International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38, 51-55 (S.D. Fla.

1972); Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 139-40 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County 1949);
Treece, Patent Policy and Pre-emption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI.

L. REv. 80, 87 (1964); 71 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 38, at 1456, 1467. Limited
duration of the patent monopoly was also found to be a congressional policy. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).

185. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 578 (1973) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
186. See 376 U.S. at 232; 376 U.S. at 238. A state could require labeling of products and protect trademark rights.
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mination of the degree to which state regulation may infringe the federal competition policy.
A parallel application of Sears and Compco would compel the
invalidation of state statutes which prohibit copying of "writings" which
lack the level of originality required for federal copyright. Passage of
the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 indicates a congressional
that sound recordings satisfy the federal standard of originaljudgment
ity. 18 7 However, as suggested above,1 88 state protection of sound recordings has a substantial adverse impact on the national uniformity
component of the federal balance. Although the Sears and Compco
opinions did not emphasize this element of federal policy in reaching
a decision, the Court did recognize it as an ingredient in constitutional
and congressional policy.'8 9 Moreover, Congress has noted that modern means of dissemination create an even greater need for uniformity. 9'
Given the federal preference for competition defined in Sears
and Compco, perpetual state protection for a "writing" which is within
the national economy would appear to conflict with federal policy to
a degree sufficient to invoke the supremacy clause.
Following a line of thought developed in cases involving attacks
on state law based upon the commerce clause, congressional silence
on a subject of national concern might be interpreted as an expression
of the legislative will that the subject be free of state regulation.' 91
This approach over-simplifies the multiplicity of factors which often
underlie congressional inaction 92 and is contradicted by direct evidence
of an absence of a congressional intent regarding state protection for
sound recordings. 193 The principal objection to this analysis is that
187. But cf. NIMMER, supra note 21, § 35.225, at 146.23-.24. Professor Nimmer
suggested that the savings clause in the Amendment might be construed as removing
the pre-emptive effect of the Copyright Act on state law rights affecting sound recordings fixed prior to the effective date of the Amendment.
188. See notes 118-21 and 125-127 & accompanying text supra.
189. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228, 230, 231 n.7 (1964).
190. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1967).
191. E.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 555 (1891); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100,
109-10 (1890); Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HARV. L. Rnv. 200, 201-02, 220
(1928); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rlv. 1 (1940);
Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 556,
583-87 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Sholley]; cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (state regulation of activities potentially subject
to federal regulation involved too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy).
192. See Helvering v. Hallach, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940); Sholley, supra note
191, at 587-88. See notes 178-79 & accompanying text supra.
193. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971); see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 574-75 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 576-79 (1973) (Marshall, Brennan and Blackman, J.J.,dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "the Court adopted in [Sears and Compcol a rule
of construction that, unless the failure to provide patent or copyright protection for
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it, like that in Goldstein, restricts judicial inquiry to specific legislative
intent even where Congress has not spoken. Sears and Compco, on
the other hand, defined a general scheme of federal objectives against
which state law should be weighed.
Measurement of the adverse impact of state protection on federal
copyright policy involves the question of long-term anti-competitive
effects of commercial piracy within a particular industry. Few recordings released by major producers are profitable, and the production
and marketing costs of a single recording can reach $200,000.'
In
addition, consumer demand for a recording in the popular music field
is often ephemeral. 95 On the basis of this commercial context, it may
be argued that the intrusion of record piracy would tend to both reduce
the volume of new production by major companies and discourage the
entry of new businesses. 9 6 As a consequence, the consumer would
face higher prices and more limited variety in recordings. If these
economic predictions were accurate, the need to promote authorship
of sound recordings might well outweigh the advantages of short-term
competition.
Sears and Compco, however, did not approach the federal question
with a view toward determining the wisdom of copyright protection
in particular instances. Indeed practical and constitutional constraints
on the Court's function preclude judicial formulation of copyright policy. Full scale investigation into the merits of copyright protection for
sound recordings should rest with the national legislature. 97 In the
absence of congressional action on a particular category of "writing",
the general purposes of the constitutional grant of power and the implementing federal statutes provide sound criteria for the determination of the validity of state law under the supremacy clause. Instead
of shifting the burden of pre-emption to a silent Congress, Sears and
Compco announced federal standards which could serve as guidelines
for the development of state remedies consistent with the broad aims
of federal copyright.
some class of works could clearly be shown to reflect a judgment that state regulation
was permitted, the silence of Congress would be taken to reflect a judgment that free
competition should prevail." Id. at 577-78.

194.

Brief for Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae

at 6-9 and 16, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
195. See Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 8, pt. 2, at 917-19 (1966);
Note, The Sound Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High ('s, 40 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 964, 975 (1972); 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.164, 173 (1971).
196. See 23 MAINE L. REV., supra note 121, at 374-75; cf. Note, Performer's
Rights and Copyright: The Protection of Sound Recordings From Modern Pirates, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 548, 564 (1971); 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 164, 174-75 (1971).

197.

See note 140 & accompanying text supra.
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A Proposal for an Alternative State Remedy
Sears and Compco did not prohibit all state recognition of property interests in "writings"; 198 rather, the decision left open a range of
alternative remedies which might supplement federal copyright in areas
omitted from the Copyright Act. Given the potential adverse effects
of commercial piracy upon a major industry within its economy, a state
could properly enforce a limited right against the acquisition of an unfair competitive advantage. 199
Although its authority has been questioned, 90 InternationalNews
Service v. Associated Press20 remains the classic statement of the misappropriation theory of unfair competition. 20 2 The elements of this
cause of action are (1) "quasi-property"-as between competitors
equity will acknowledge a property right in an item of commercial
value which is acquired through the investment of time, effort and
money; (2) appropriation and competitive use of the plaintiff's merchandise at little or no expense to the defendant; (3) diversion of a
material portion of the profits otherwise accruing to the plaintiff.20 3
International News Service involved copying and distribution of news
gathered by a competing news service agency, and the peculiar fleeting
quality of the exchange value of news provided the impetus for the
Court's landmark decision.20 4 Consistent with the economic character
of news, the Court upheld an injunction against the taking or gainful
use "of the complainant's news. . . 'until its commercial value as news
to the complainant. . . has passed away.' "25

Misappropriation has been relied upon to distinguish duplication

20
of sound recordings from the rule announced in Sears and Compco;

however, the terms of the injunction in InternationalNews Service sug198. See note 186 supra.
199. See notes 84-85 & accompanying text supra.
200. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315, 318
(1st Cir. 1967); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified
on other grounds, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958).
201. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
202. See e.g., Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781-83
(2d Cir. 1964); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603,
606-07 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 App. Div.
158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1966).
203. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 239-40
(1918).
204. See Id. at 238-39. The economic value of news depends upon its "novelty
and freshness." News which was published and distributed in the eastern cities could
be copied and transmitted to western papers for release at least as early as that of
the plaintiff's subscribers.
205. Id. at 245 (emphasis omitted).
206. See notes 86-97 & accompanying text supra.
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gest a limited mode of protection which could comply with the federal
policy defined in Sears and Compco. Generally, most profits from
recordings, like those from news, are earned in the initial period after
release.2 °7 In order to preserve the record producer's investment, a
state could postpone the duplicator's sale of competing recordings for
the period of time necessary for the producer to recoup his prerelease
costs. 2° 8 After this period, a duplicator would be allowed, upon the
payment of a limited royalty to the producer, to release reproductions
of the producer's recording. 2 9 Alternatively, a duplicator could be
required to disgorge profits on a pirated recording to the extent of an
adjusted portion the original producer's costs in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
Thus, limited remedies can be devised which both minimize longterm adverse effects on competition and preserve public access to lowcost reproductions. Such proposals are also more compatible with the
composer's rights under section 1(e) of the Copyright Act. Lack of
uniformity could be resolved through uniform state statutes or action
by the Federal Trade Commission; 2 10 however, even in the absence of
uniform state protection, an injunction limited in time could probably
withstand scrutiny under the Sears and Compco test.
Conclusion
Although Goldstein v. California expressly reaffirms the Sears and
Compco decisions,2 1 ' the actual effect of the Court's opinion is to limit
Sears and Compco to their precise facts. The Court also overruled
sub silentio that part of the Sears and Compco decisions that based the
pre-emption of state protection on the copyright and patent clause.
Under the Court's literal interpretation, Art. 1, §8, cl. 8 no longer appears to have any impact on state law, and the question of the compatibility of state and federal remedies is purely a matter of congres207. See note 195 & accompanying text supra.
208. Cf. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134
(9th Cir. 1965) ("head start" injunction against wrongful use of trade secrets); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492, 499-500 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook
County 1970) ("tailored" injunction against record piracy); 71 COLUM. L. REv., supra

note 38, at 1467-68. In the event that a producer could not recover his initial costs,
a duplicator could, after a reasonable period of time, compete upon compliance with
the proposed royalty system.
209. See Good Guys and Bad Guys in the Tape Recording Industry: A Legal
study at 13-14, publication appearing in Vol. 6977 United States Supreme Court Records, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
210. See Federal Trade Commission v. Orient Music Roll Co., 2 F.T.C. 176

(1919), in which the commission granted an injunction against the duplication of music rolls based upon the misappropriation theory of unfair competition. See RINGER,
supra note 7, at 165.

211.

412 U.S. at 571.
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sional intent.2 1 Goldstein did recognize the constitutional purpose of
national uniformity; however, the Court justified state copyright on the
grounds of its exclusively local subject matter and effect.
The Goldstein approach is consistent with the general revision of
the Copyright Act now before Congress.2 13 Under the revision bill,
"all rights in the nature of copyright in works that come within the subject matter of copyright as specified [in the revision bill] are governed exclusively by this title," and sound recordings are a specifically
enumerated class.21 4 The revision bill does, however, leave open the
question of the validity of state copyright for classes of "writings" not
specified in the revised copyright statutes. As to these categories,
Goldstein provides the answer that there are no constitutional barriers
to state protection.
The Court's failure squarely to confront the purposes behind the
constitutional limits on the copyright monopoly invites criticism.
Goldstein does not adquately explain its departure from the federal
preference for competition articulated in Sears and Compco, and the
Court's analysis of the impact of state protection for sound recordings
on the national market appears unsound. In light of the proposed alternative remedies, the Court's neglect of the fundmental objectives of
federal copyright seems too high a price to pay for a solution to the
problem of record piracy. It is hoped that the Court will reconsider
the Sears and Compco opinions with a view toward the development
of a standard of federal pre-emption consonant with the purposes of
the copyright clause.
Dane J. Durham*
212. In narrowing the pre-emption issue to this extent, the Court abandoned the
historical boundary between state and federal protection-namely publication. As to
categories of works omitted from the Copyright Act, the Court held that publication
is a state issue; thus, state common law copyright could extend beyond the public distribution of the work. The Court's opinion invites acceptance of the principle of Donaldsons v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774), which conditioned the divestiture
of common law rights upon the availability of statutory copyright. See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 n.28 (1973). See note 33 supra.
213. S. 1361, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
214. Id. at §§ 301 & 102. The rule of pre-emption announced in section 301 applies to copyrightable works created before and after January 1, 1975; therefore, California Penal Code section 653h would be pre-empted even as applied to the recordings
under litigation in Goldstein.
* Member, Second Year Class.

